Beranda » Pertahanan dan Keamanan » Non-Offensive Defense: South Korean Case

Non-Offensive Defense: South Korean Case

NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENSE STRATEGY: SOUTH KOREAN CASE

 

Introduction

Among all the hotspots in Northeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula remains the most perilous conflict potentially, where a South Korea, fully supported by the U.S., confronts a hermitic North Korea, backed up by its geographical neighbor, China.  Despite its chronic economical and social problems, North Korea has repeatedly ignited bouts of instability in the Korean Peninsula,[1] and is the most militarized country in the world and a potential nuclear capability.[2]  On the other hand, the far more prosperous South Korea has adopted a far more passive posture and desists from provocation through a soft approach of Non-Offensive Defense (NOD), as its main instrument to deal with North Korean aggression.

Two emerging mainstream criticisms of the South Korean strategy of the NOD have arisen of late.  “Softliners” positively call for the non-offensive posture, dialogue and diplomacy, but conversely, “hardliners” satirize the South Korean government as far too idealistic, being too dependent on the U.S. to ensure security, and pursuing a policy of appeasing North Korea.  The hardliners argue that North Korea has already gone too far with on a number of occasions with belligerent actions and advocate a stronger stance by South Korea.  Intelligence reports reveal that North Korea has endeavored to obtain Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) through clandestine programmes since the mid-1980,[3] and had conducted nuclear explosion tests in 2006 and 2006.[4]  Next, two serious provocations occurred in 2010, when North Korea intentionally torpedoed the Cheonan sub-marine and bombarded Yeonpyeong island.[5]  From the hardliners’ perspective, the South Korean armed forces are already relatively stronger than those of North Korea, and so it would be very logical if the South Korean government launches punitive reaction.  However, the South Korean government steadily forbears the bitter blows, and as a consequence, North Korea continues to provoking with its arrogant and rotten policies.

Beyond all critiques, it would appear that the South Korean choice of NOD strategy has contributed largely to the Korean Peninsula stability since the Armistice of 1953.  It has also successfully driven South Korean development programmes, allowing it to achieve significant progress.  Nevertheless, the threatening atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula is lingering, and the lurking artillery North Korean along the border can suddenly shower a rain of fire.  Furthermore, the geopolitical contest between the U.S. and China is another critical situation that can rise to the intolerable periphery, and could potentially involve all four countries in the conflict.[6] Accordingly, some worries have emerged within the South Korean hardliners, regarding whether or not the NOD strategy will continue to be relevant in dealing with future challenges. To deal with all notions, this article will highlight the viability of the South Korean NOD strategy vis-a-vis the North Korean “military first” policy.

 

NOD: From The Cold War to The Korean Case

Military practitioners have argued that the offensive strategy was very attractive, putative, and nationalistic,[7] but soon afterwards it became devastating when enemies are able to pursue an offensive strategy as well.  Thereafter, the military started to explore the defensive defense as well as the offensive defense strategy.  Clausewitz stated that the defensive position would designate more powerful formation and preservation of waging war. He also reiterated that the defensive formation should be designed not as a simple shield but a shield designed of well-driven assaults,[8] and a defense without intentions to counterattack was absurd.[9]  In the offense-defense balance theory (the security dilemma theory), Robert Jervis stated that the major war could be avoided, while the defense was more advantageous than the offense.[10]  According to these notions,  it could be noticed that the defensive strategy was not a term of appeasing enemies, but it was a real triumph strategy, as well as the offensive strategy.

The idea of NOD began to emerge in lately 1970s, as the reciprocal nature of the realist idea.  The realist idea articulated that every state should protect itself maximally from the anarchial international system,[11] and as the consequence, several international conflicts fuelled the armed race.  While the arm race of the Cold War presented the reality of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) across the world, the NOD strategy offered a new idea of avoiding such a possibility.  Nevertheless, in the early era, the NOD ideas were marginalised by the policy makers in its homeland, Europe, and it was only an interesting notion for some experts in Germany, Denmark and several neutral countries.   Thereafter, NOD was adopted in various ideas of non-provocative defense, territorial defense, defensive deterrence, conventional deterrence, or alternative deterrence.[12]  Bjorn Muller defined NOD as the armed forces which were capable to exhibit its totality in non-offensive defense, yet insufficient capability of offense.[13]  Another definition by Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker argues that the NOD was a total capability of the armed forces which was able to conduct a credible defense without being dependent on nuclear armaments, while capacity of offense was insufficient.[14]  Based on these perspectives, the NOD strategy would be involve in areas of facilitating arms control, disarmament, strengthening peace, promoting crisis stability, enhancing public support, improving the international political environment and etc.[15]

The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1987 exemplified NOD as one of triumphant strategies.  It also evidenced that the aggressive and provocative arm race could not guarantee of fulfilling the political ends.  On the contrary, it could falsify the projection of national resources. The Soviet Union adopted the NOD model to restructure its armed forces and to reset its military relations with the West.  From this success, the NOD strategy inspired many other countries during the post-Cold War.  However, there was an increment revision of the NOD strategy after the Soviet’s bankrupcy.  Previously, most theorists and practitioners had defined the term of NOD as a deterrence with nuclear weapons in minimum capacity, but subsequently they strove to reject the reliance on those weapons.

Historically, the South Korean policy of opting the defensive defense culture had previously started before the modern formulation of NOD.  It was begun on 25 June 1950, when the unprepared South Korean armed forces were bombarded by masses of the North Korean invasion forces.  As a new country with inferior military strength, South Korea realised that the defensive strategy with the U.S support was the only viable option to assure its sovereignty. Moreover, having just emerged victorious from World War II, the U.S. also did not want to escalate the Korean War at that time.  After the desperate era of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union provided fresh impetus for South Korea employ the NOD as its plausible and winning strategy.

South Korean incessant efforts to reconciliate tensions across the Korean Peninsula began since its independence, and one of the most ambitious ideas to diplomatically reconciliate the Korean conflict was named as the sunshine policy.  The South Korean government, inspired by President Kim Dae Jung’s thinking during 1998-2003, actively approached North Korea with political overtures aim at achieving peaceful coexistence through cooperation and exchange.  For more strategic assurance, a more defensive military posture was pursued along with the use of multilateral diplomacy to resolve regional strategic instability.[16]  South Korea also opted to refrain from the North Korean war intent, and it harvested a summit meeting of both Presidents, Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae Jung, in Pyongyang in 2000.  Unluckily, the South Korean peace solicitation was shortly underrated and rejected. North Korea subsequently abandoned the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and they claimed of possessing the nuclear capacity in 2005.[17] Thereafter, the future of the Korean Peninsula has become more complex.

Indeed, the Korean case was apparently worse than the Cold War, due to its geographical situation and historical context.  While the Soviet Union and the U.S. were separated by the continental landmark, both Koreans were unluckily located in a very close vicinity.  Most ballistic weaponries from both armies could reach all targets on the Korean Peninsula theatre. Some South Korean major cities were close to the DMZ, so they were very vulnerable from the North Korean lurking artillery.  Another dilemma concerns geographical setting with both countries also sharing contradictive geographical justification of the Korean Peninsula.  While South Korea, backed up by the U.N. and most of the international community, argued that the North Korean maneuvers were blatantly provocative, North Korea, on the other hand, justified its military actions, including its “military first” policy, as a supreme national duty for liberating their own land from the U.S. or foreign invasion.[18]

Whilst the distinguished leadership of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev played the main role of dismantling the Cold War, the North Korean dictatorship was the concrete block against the Korean reconciliation.  As reiterated by former President Kim Il Sung, the North Korean authoritative strategical culture was rooted in the Leninism and the Maoism leadership of Juche ideology, or “a spirit of self-reliance”.  It stated that the Korean masses were subjects of the development and country needed strong military posture to rely on.[19] Kim Il Sung also stated, “A conflict does not require solution, because it is the solution itself.”[20]  As the hardliners’ argument, because the North Korean authoritative system, backed by its “military first” strategy, had always cowarded the South Korean’s leadership and its NOD strategy, consequently the political relation between both countries became odd.

 

South Korean Defensive Military Posture in the Current Status

Despite the ongoing critiques of continuously appeasing the North and depending on the U.S forces to back up, it can be argued that South Korea has mostly succeeded to elaborate the term of NOD military strategy within its national strategy. Although the Korean security circumstance has been perennially unstable, South Korea could design more proper military strategy than the North Korean version of the “military first” strategy.  In recent status, South Korea is successful in major areas, and on the contrary, North Korea seems to suffer some chronic problems of society, politic and economy.  While the South Korean GDP rises to USD 1.574 trillion and ranks 13 of the world,[21] and on the other hand, the North Korean GDP remains at USD 40 billion and ranks 99 of the world.[22]   Surely, the South Korean success of embracing the recent status is highly related to its NOD strategy towards North Korea.

Performing under capacity during the Korean War and some following decades, the South Korean armed forces reformed their capability continuously.  In recent status, the South Korean military capability is relatively superior than that of North Korea, and they are more confident for possibilities of confronting North Korea, even without the U.S. support.   South Korean annual spending for the military is also three times larger than that of North Korea.  In this year alone, the South Korean expenditure for the armed forces is USD 28,28 million or  2,7% of GDP, not including three special funds of military installations, relocation of the U.S. bases, and welfare for troops. These programmes consume of USD 372 million, USD 869.65 million and USD 1,066 billion respectively in 2009, 2010 and 2011.[23]  On the contrary, the North Korean military budget is only NKW 90 million or about  USD 9.9 million this year,[24] or about 25-30% of the total GDP.[25]

Indeed, if the assessment of military balance may be simply a factor to ignite the war, South Korea has a possibility to overwhelm its northern enemy.  Several techniques for assessing the military balance also determines the South Korean stronger capability than those of the North, regardless the support of the U.S. firepower.[26]  The South Korean annual military expenditure remains approximately three times larger than that of North Korea in the recent decade.[27]  These facts can possibly drive the South Korean military policy to offensively confront North Korea.  A logical alarm may arise from the North Korean military deployment along the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ).  Among all North Korean forces, about 80% armaments and 56% units of the total forces are deployed along the DMZ.  Theoretically, the North Korean weapons in the DMZ are capable to reach most of the South Korean strategical assets and major cities in a sudden assault.[28]

In the term of conventional forces, many reports exemplify the South Korean advantages.  The recent U.S. and South Korea defense cooperation has previously agreed the ballistic missile programme as a part of the South Korean defensive posture,[29] and as a result South Korea has been able to declare a successful missile test of the Hyunmoo series with a range of up to 930 miles.[30]  This effort is purposely to back up its NOD military posture towards the North.  Based on the current resource, the South Korean Army consists of 1484 tanks (K1/K1A1), 300 APCs (tBv206), artilleries (K-9 Thunder), and 206 missiles (158 MIM-23B I-Hawk and 48 Patriot).  The Navy consists of 14 sub-marines (9 Chang Bogo, 3 SSK Son Won-ill, 2 KSS-1 Dolgorae), 10 destroyers (1 Sejong KDX-III, 6 Chungmugong Yi Sun-Jhin KDX-II, 3 Gwanggaeto Daewang KDX-I), 9 corvettes (3 Gumdoksuri, 4 Po Hang, 4 Dong Hae) and 32 aircrafts (8 PC-3 Orion and 24 Lynx MK99).   The Air Force consists of  561 fighter aircrafts (59 F-15K, 164 KF-16C/D, 68 F-4E, 170 F-5, 20 FA-50), 24 recce aircrafts (4 Hawker 800A, 20 KO-1), early warnings (Hawker 800SIG), drones and other numerous aircrafts.[31] The South Korean armed forces consist of 65,000 airmen, 68,000 navies and 522,000 armies.[32]

Backed up mostly by Chinese and Russian technology, the North Korean Army consists of 3500 tanks (T-55, T-59/T-62, PT-76, T-82, Storm Tiger).  The Air Force consists of 678 fighter and attacker aircrafts (40 MiG-29, 56 MiG-23, 150 MiG-21, 40 Chengdu-7, 98 Shenyang F-6, 100 Shenyang F-5, 80 Harbin H-5, 40 Nanchang A-5, 36 Su-25, 18 Su-7,  20 Mi-24), 200 transport aircrafts, helicopters and drones.  The Air Defence consists of 350 missiles (179 SAM-2, 133 SAM-3, 38 SAM-5).  The Navy consists of 50 sub-marines (22 SSK PRC Type-031/FSU Romeo and 28 SSI).  The aggregate personnels of the North Korean armed forces are 110,000 airmen, 60,000 navies, and 1,020,000 armies.[33]

Under the 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty, the U.S. facilitates the presence of U.S Forces Korea (USFK) with about 28,000 active soldiers and numerous weapons. [34]  The USFK will back up the South Korean defense from external aggression. Interestingly, the U.S back up becomes the most crucial factor to drive the South Korean confidence of maintaining the defensive military posture.  Based on Operation Plan (OPLAN) – 5027, the USFK and the ROK Armed Forces will respond jointly, if the aggression emerges.[35]  Another back up, the U.S Forces Japan (USFJ) with approximately 38,000 active personnels will also automatically involve if the Korean war pops up.[36]

Beyond all advantages enjoyed by the South Korean and the USFK forces, it does not mean that war will be an easy option for South Korea.  The military situation on the Korean Peninsula may also be characterised as a military competition between the North Korean asymmetric power advantage, suspiciously supported by China military aids, and the South Korean conventional defense superiority, backed up by the USFK and the USFJ.  By virtue of the other facts, the South Korean NOD strategy should consider the Northern complex mixes of irregular wars, terrorism actions, ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), paramilitary and CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear).  At the aggregated level, once the war breaks up between both Koreas, it will generate total war between them and drag directly the U.S., Japan, and possibly China into the open conflict.[37]   Even though, the South Korean military forces and the U.S. Forces may overwhelm North Korea and China presumably, but the war may level all the Korean Peninsula. The impact will annihilate the South Korean achievements during the last five decades.

 

South Korean NOD Strategy in the Future

In the majority, South Korea has been exploring the NOD strategy into its international policy. Not only towards North Korea, but it has been utilised to deal with other key neighboring countries.  However, the tension between both Koreans are inevitable due to some factors of the historical and geographical perspectives, and also the North Korean odd leadership status.  A sudden maneuver could unpredictably appear from the North Korean new leadership of striving his fame.  To deal with all options in the future, the South Korean government should endeavor four plausible programmes: (1) maintaining the defensive deterrence and retaliatory capability, (2) preventing the war and promoting peace through dialogues, (3) facilitating arms control and disarmament, and (4) improving the crisis management.

In the context of maintaining the defensive deterrence and retaliatory capability, South Korean military forces should continuously focus on the threat assessment of the North Korean conventional and non-conventional military capabilities. Nowadays, the South Korean armed forces are quite strong to confront North Korea, and they are the seventh-largest armed forces of the world, by spending only 2.7% of GDP.[38]   At the same time, North Korea only ranks twenty-second after expending about 25% of GDP.[39]  However, the surplus of military balance is probably very slight. To deal with it, the calculation of the North Korean capability is pivotal to give the exact determination of the military deterrence. The Hyunmoo ballistic missile programme of providing stand-off armaments is also an important leverage to  assess the affordable military balance, to provide the defensive deterrence and to bridge the ballistic missile technology. Hence, the ballistic missile programmes also send an important message is that, although South Korea has been growing stronger, but the peaceful diplomacy is always at the forefront.

By virtue of the recent political assessment in North East Asia, it can be argued that the role of 1954 South Korea and U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty remains reasonable.  The U.S. presence is not rooted in the South Korean inferiority, but it will assure that the deterrence will work without the arm race of both Koreans.  Rationally, if the U.S military forces disengage from the Korean Peninsula, South Korea will not take the high risk for its security.[40] The powerful military back up, including the nuclear umbrella, will disappear.  It will compel South Korea to redefine the approach of its military balance. Therefore, the South Korean armed forces may part company with the NOD strategy for a more aggressive strategy.  While the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty is extant, South Korea can run the development process comprehensively, since it would not need to be involved in an extensive arms race. Notwithstanding the fore-brooding presence of the North Korean leadership and weapons at the DMZ, the U.S. troops presence in the joint patrol programme along the DMZ serves as a highly effective deterrent to prohibit the North invasion intent. If North Korea decides to invade, the invasion will not merely belong to South Korea, but it will also challenge the U.S.

The option of preventing war and promoting peace through dialogues hardly provides enough guarantees in view of the xenophobic nature of North Korean’s authoritative leadership.  Previously, North Korea has been notorious as an unholy negotiator and a chronic betrayer of agreements. Nevertheless, despite the stagnation of the sun-shine policy, the diplomacy options should continuously seek some other solutions.  South Korea experiences of facilitating international dialogues and cooperation will be very beneficial to attribute the future negotiations.  In the Korean Peninsula case, dialogues should involve the U.N., the U.S. and China.  Because, the U.S is the only country which has a plausible power to put pressure on North Korea and China.

As the previous argument, the NOD strategy will also accommodate the affordable military balance. More importantly, the NOD strategy should be exhibited by a clear statement of its end objective and its capacity to deal with the hostile interest,[41] so that it can minimize the political challenges within the South Korean community.   Consequently, South Korea should design a military posture which can provide the defensive deterrence and retaliatory reaction. By virtue of this defense programme, it is also important to exhibit the South Korean peaceful commitment to all countries, so that the initiative of facilitating arms control, disarmament and denuclearization, should be at the forefront among all military approaches. In this context, South Korea should persuade or even pressure North Korea, to design the second armistice agreement of removing all artilleries and missiles from the DMZ.  The price of annihilating all weapons from the DMZ will be most valuable among all approaches,[42] because it can exhibit the North Korean initial commitment to create the perennial peace on the peninsula.

Theoretically, managing a crisis is to conquer the crisis itself, and at the same time, all parties can maintain the potential peril, till the edge of tolerable limitation and risk.[43]  South Korean leadership has previously constructed this notion to manage the crisis on the Korean Peninsula.  It has mostly performed the respectful character in crisis inflicted by the North Korean provocations. Hence, South Korea should continue to explore its distinguished character in the future crisis.  It will put the coercive instrument far behind, and opt to deter or punish North Korea through the international pressures or sanctions.  In so doing, if South Korea intends to successfully orchestrate the Korean Peninsula, the policy maker should be capable to recognise the entire crisis, then manage it to the edge of the tolerable periphery.

 

Conclusion

Confronting all declining notions, it can be argued that the NOD strategy can mostly orchestrate the crisis with smart strategies. More importantly, the choice of NOD strategy is not merely of political masculinity or femininity, but it is a comprehensive assessment which can help the government to successfully deal with several stakes of international discrepancy.   The NOD strategy will not neglect the military balance, but it will work as defensive deterrence and retaliatory action.  As in the Korean case, although South Korea can afford stronger armed forces, it always opts not to run the arm race.

Despite some critiques of depending the Ally, the South Korean decision of maintaining its defensive military alliance with the U.S. is considerably a smart maneuver.  This decision will be much cheaper and safer than the perennial arm race. As long as the North Korean policy towards South Korea remains lurking, the U.S. disengagement will trigger South Korea behaving aggressively as those of the North. Thus, the option of sustaining the Mutual Defense Treaty to respond the potential aggression is rational.  This treaty is not merely to coward the South Korean combat capabilities, but indeed, it is an instrument to prohibit South Korea from the unaffordable arm race, to deter the North Korean intention of war, and also to prevent the potential involvement of other malicious countries.

All in all, the contradictive historical and geographical perspectives between both Koreans contribute to survive the conflict.  Nevertheles, the NOD strategy drives well South Korea to embrace its current status as a major economy actor, a stable democratic country, and a major military power, and at the same time, North Korea suffers chronic problems of democracy, society and economy.  It is also true that the North Korean dictatorship and its “military first” strategy are dangerous and aggressive, but suffering the financial problem.  While the military advantages are gained, but the war theatre is geographically unfavorable, it is true that managing the crisis and the arm race through the NOD strategy is the most workable approach on the Korean Peninsula.  In the future, South Korea should continue to explore the NOD strategy comprehensively, not only to deter the enemy militarily, but also to win the end goal of the political policy.

 

 

*****

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Jae-Jung Suh, Assessing the Military Balance in Korea, Asian Perspective Vol. 28, No. 4, Vol. 2004, p. 63-88. Online, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/ v28n4-d.pdf (retrieved at 2 September 2012)

 

Bates Gill, China’s North Korea Policy Assessing Interests and Influences, United States Institute for Peace, Special Report 283, July 2011. Online, available at http://www.usip. org/files/resources/China’s_North_Korea_Policy.pdf  (retrieved at 15 September 2012)

 

Mark Fitzpatrick (eds), Disarmament Diplomacy With North Korea”, in “North Korean security challenges: a net assessment, IISS Strategic Dossler Journal 11 Juli 2011 p. 5.

 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SISPRI), Nuclear Forces Development, War Nuclear Forces January 2012. Online, available at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/nbc/nuclear. (retrieved at 8 September 2012)

 

Sung-Cool Lee, The ROK and U.S. Political and Military Joint Response to North Korea Armed Provocations, October 2011, p. 20. Online, available at http://csis.org/files/ publication/ 111006_Lee_ROKUSJointResponse_web.pdf (retrieved at 5 September 2012)

 

Robert Jervis, The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,  The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 1980), p. 563-592.  Online, available at http://www. jstor.org/stable/173775 (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

 

Stephen Van Evera, Offense, Defense, and the Cause of War, International Security Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998) p. 5-6.

 

Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton University Press, 1989), p.358-359.

 

Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dillema, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), p. 167-214, as cited in Charles L. Glasser and Chaim Kauffman in “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?”, International Security Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4, (Spring 1998), p. 44.

 

Barry Buzan, Does NOD Have a Future in the Post-Cold War World, in the Bjorn Moller and Hakan Wiberg (Eds), “Non Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century”, (London and Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 11.

 

Geoffrey Wisemann, Concepts of Non-Provocative Defence – Ideas and Practices in International Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, March 2002), p. 3.

 

Bjorn Muller, Non-offensive defence in the Middle East?, (United Nations, 1998), p.6. Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker, Non-Nuclear, Non-Provocative Defence for Europe,in P. Terrence Hopmann & Frank Barnaby (eds.), Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), pp. 135-145, quotation from p. 137, as cited by Bjorn Moller in “Common Security and Non-offensive Defense – A Neorealist Perspective”, (London:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 1.

 

Geoffrey Wisemann, NOD and the Asia-Pasific Region, in Bjorn Moller and Hakan Wiberg (Eds), “Non Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century”, (London and Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p.213.

 

Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, Sunshine in Korea – The South Korean Debate Over Policies Towards North Korea, RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. Online, available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/RAND_  MR1555.pdf (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

 

Seongwhun Cheon, Negotiating with Korea and the U.S.: North Korea’s Strategy and Objectives, International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. XVI No. 1 Spring 2012, p. 144-159.

 

Grace Lee, The Political Philosophy of Juke, Stanford Journal of East Asian AffairsVol. 3 No. 1 Spring 2003, p. 105-112. Online, available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/ sjeaa/journal3/korea1.pdf (retrieved at 18 September 2012)

 

Homer T. Hodge, North Korea’s Military Strategy, Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly – Spring 2003.  Online, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/ parameters/Articles/03spring/hodge.pdf (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

 

Central Intelligency Agency, The World Fact Book – South Korea. Online, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications//the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

 

Central Intelligency Agency, The World Fact Book – North Korea. Online, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html  (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

 

SISPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure. Online, available at http://milexdata.sipri.org/ result.php4 (retrieved at 9 September 2012).

 

ForexTicket. Online, available at http://www.forexticket.co.uk/en/ currency/converter-KPW-USD. (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

 

SISPRI online and International Institute for Strategic Studies Journal Volume 111, Issue 1, 2011, The Military Balance 2011, (London: Routledge, 2011), p.195-292.

 

Global Security, World Wide Military Expenditures – 2011.  Online, available at http://www.globalsecurity .org/military/ world/spending.htm.  (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

 

International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS), The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula, 1 September 2012. Online, available at http://www.iiss.org/ publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/the-conventional-military-balance-on-the-kore/ (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

 

See Chung-in Moon and Sangkeun Lee, Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula, Asian Perspective, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, pp. 69-99 and Jae-Jung Suh, “Assessing the Military Balance in Korea”, Asian Perspective Vol. 28, No. 4, Vol. 2004, p. 63-88.

 

New York Times, South Korea Says It Has New Missile, 19 April 2012. Online, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/20/world/asia/south-korea-confirms-deployment-of-cruise-missile.html?_r=1 (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

 

See Centre for Strategic and International Studies, The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring Countries, 6 May 2011. Online, available at http://csis.org/files/publication/110712_Cordesman_ KoreaMilBalance_WEB.pdf  (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

 

International Institute for Strategic Studies Journal Volume 111, Issue 1, 2011, The Military Balance 2011, (London: Routledge, 2011), p.195-292.

 

United States Forces Korea. Online available at http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/command. command.philosophy.554 (retrieved at 18 September 2012)

 

United States Forces Japan.  Online, available at http://www.usfj.mil/ (retrieved at 18 September 2012)

 

Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces And the Forces of Key Neighboring the Forces of Key Neighboring States Main Report, 6 May 2011. Online, available at http://csis.org/files/ publication/110506_KoreaMilitaryBalanceMainRpt.pdf (retrieved at 11 September 2012)

 

Global Fire Power, Country Comparison. Online, available at http://www.globalfirepower. com/countries-comparison-detail.asp (retrieved at 11 September 2012)

 

Yoon Taeyoung, Between Peace and War: South Korea’s Crisis Management Strategies Towards North Korea, East Asian Review vol. 15, no. 3, Autumn 2003, pp.3-22 http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol15_3/15_3_1.pdf (retrieved at 11 September 2012)

 

Richard J. Harknet, The Logic of Conventional Deterrence and the End of the Cold War, Security Studies Journal, No. 1 (Autumn 1994), p. 105.

 

Williams R. Kintner and David C. Schwarz, A Study on Crisis Management (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Foreign Policy Research Institute,1965), Appendix B, p. 21, as quoted in Williams, Crisis Management, p. 29.


[1]     Jae-Jung Suh, Assessing the Military Balance in Korea, Asian Perspective Vol. 28, No. 4, Vol. 2004, p. 63-88. Online, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v28n4-d.pdf (retrieved at 2 September 2012)

[2]     Bates Gill, China’s North Korea Policy Assessing Interests and Influences, United States Institute for Peace, Special Report 283, July 2011. Online, available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/ China’s_North_Korea_Policy.pdf (retrieved at 15 September 2012)

[3]     Mark Fitzpatrick (eds), Disarmament Diplomacy With North Korea”, in North Korean Security Challenges: ANet Assessment, IISS Strategic Dossler Journal 11 Juli 2011 p. 5.

[4]     Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SISPRI), Nuclear Forces Development, War Nuclear Forces, January 2012. Online, available at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/nbc/nuclear. (retrieved at 8 September 2012)

[5]     Sung-Cool Lee, The ROK and U.S. Political and Military Joint Response to North Korea Armed Provocations, October 2011, p. 20. Online, available at http://csis.org/files/publication/ 111006_Lee_ROKUSJointResponse_web.pdf (retrieved at 5 September 2012)

[6]     Robert Jervis, The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,  Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 1980), p. 563-592.  Online, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/173775 (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

[7]     Stephen Van Evera, Offense, Defense, and the Cause of War, International Security Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998) p. 5-6.

[8]     Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton University Press, 1989), p.358-359. Ibid.

[9]     Ibid.

[10]   Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dillema, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), p. 167-214, as cited in Charles L. Glasser and Chaim Kauffman in “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?”, International Security Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4, (Spring 1998), p. 44.

[11]   Barry Buzan, Does NOD Have a Future in the Post-Cold War World, in the Bjorn Moller and Hakan Wiberg (Eds), “Non Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century”, (London and Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 11.

[12]   Geoffrey Wisemann, Concepts of Non-Provocative Defence – Ideas and Practices in International Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, March 2002), p. 3.

[13]   Bjorn Muller, Non-offensive defence in the Middle East?, (United Nations, 1998), p.6.

[14]   Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker, Non-Nuclear, Non-Provocative Defence for Europe,

in P. Terrence Hopmann & Frank Barnaby (eds.), Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in

Europe, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), pp. 135-145, quotation from p. 137, as cited by Bjorn Moller in “Common Security and Non-offensive Defense – A Neorealist Perspective”, (London:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 1.

[15]   Geoffrey Wisemann, NOD and the Asia-Pasific Region, in Bjorn Moller and Hakan Wiberg (Eds), “Non Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century”, (London and Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p.213.

[16]   Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, Sunshine in Korea – The South Korean Debate Over Policies Towards North Korea, RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. Online, available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ rand/pubs/monograph_reports/ 2005/RAND_MR1555.pdf (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

[17]   Seongwhun Cheon, Negotiating with Korea and the U.S.: North Korea’s Strategy and Objectives, International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. XVI No. 1 Spring 2012, p. 144-159.

[18]   Ibid.

[19]   Grace Lee, The Political Philosophy of Juke, Stanford Journal of East Asian AffairsVol. 3 No. 1 Spring 2003, p. 105-112. Online, available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal3/korea1.pdf (retrieved at 18 September 2012)

[20]   Homer T. Hodge, North Korea’s Military Strategy, Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly – Spring 2003.  Online, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/03spring/hodge.pdf (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

[21]   Central Intelligency Agency, The World Fact Book – South Korea. Online, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications//the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

[22]   Central Intelligency Agency, The World Fact Book – North Korea. Online, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html  (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

[23]   SISPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure. Online, available at http://milexdata.sipri.org/ result.php4 (retrieved at 9 September 2012).  Currency exchange is based on ForexTicket http://www.forexticket.co.uk/en/currency/converter-KPW-USD. (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

[24]   See SISPRI online and also see International Institute for Strategic Studies Journal Volume 111, Issue 1, 2011, The Military Balance 2011, (London: Routledge, 2011), p.195-292.

[25]   Global Security, World Wide Military Expenditures – 2011.  Online, available at http://www.globalsecurity .org/military/ world/spending.htm.  (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

[26]   International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS), The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula, 1 September 2012. Online, available at http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/the-conventional-military-balance-on-the-kore/ (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

[27]   See Chung-in Moon and Sangkeun Lee, Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula, Asian Perspective, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, pp. 69-99 and Jae-Jung Suh, “Assessing the Military Balance in Korea”, Asian Perspective Vol. 28, No. 4, Vol. 2004, p. 63-88.

[28]   International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS), Opcit.

[29]   CRS Report For Conggress 28 November 2011, U.S – South Korea Relation, 28 November 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf (retrieved at 19 September 2012)

[30]   New York Times, South Korea Says It Has New Missile, 19 April 2012. Online, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/20/world/asia/south-korea-confirms-deployment-of-cruise-missile.html?_r=1 (retrieved at 10 September 2012)

[31]   See Centre for Strategic and International Studies, The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring Countries, 6 May 2011. Online, available at http://csis.org/files/publication/110712_Cordesman_KoreaMilBalance_WEB.pdf  (retrieved at 10 September 2012) and also see International Institute for Strategic Studies Journal Volume 111, Issue 1, 2011, The Military Balance 2011, (London: Routledge, 2011), p.195-292.

[32]   Ibid.

[33]   Ibid.

[34]   United States Forces Korea. Online available at http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/command. command.philosophy.554 (retrieved at 18 September 2012)

[35]   Sung-Cool Lee, opcit.

[36]   United States Forces Japan.  Online, available at http://www.usfj.mil/ (retrieved at 18 September 2012)

[37]   Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces And the Forces of Key Neighboring the Forces of Key Neighbpring States Main Report, 6 May 2011. Online, available at http://csis.org/files/publication/110506_KoreaMilitaryBalanceMainRpt.pdf (retrieved at 11 September 2012)

[38]   Global Fire Power, Country Comparison. Online, available at http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.asp (retrieved at 11 September 2012)

[39]   Ibid.

[40]   Yoon Taeyoung, Between Peace and War: South Korea’s Crisis Management Strategies Towards North Korea, East Asian Review vol. 15, no. 3, Autumn 2003, pp.3-22 http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol15_3/15_3_1.pdf (retrieved at 11 September 2012)

[41]   Richard J. Harknet, The Logic of Conventional Deterrence and the End of the Cold War, Security Studies Journal, No. 1 (Autumn 1994), p. 105.

[42]   Sung-Cool Lee, Opcit.

[43]   Williams R. Kintner and David C. Schwarz, A Study on Crisis Management (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Foreign Policy Research Institute,1965), Appendix B, p. 21, as quoted in Williams, Crisis Management, p. 29.


Tinggalkan Balasan

Isikan data di bawah atau klik salah satu ikon untuk log in:

Logo WordPress.com

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Logout / Ubah )

Gambar Twitter

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Logout / Ubah )

Foto Facebook

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Logout / Ubah )

Foto Google+

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Logout / Ubah )

Connecting to %s

%d blogger menyukai ini: